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Embedded systems are the driving force for technological development in many domains such 
as automotive, healthcare, and industrial control in the emerging post-PC era. As more and 
more computational and networked devices are integrated into all aspects of our lives in a 
pervasive and invisible way, security becomes critical for the dependability of all smart or 
intelligent systems built upon these embedded systems.  
Most embedded device software is not updated after deployment. This is because chip 
manufacturers and system manufacturers (usually original device manufacturers) do not have 
any incentive, expertise, or even ability to patch the software once it is shipped. This leaves 
IoT developers to improvise their own ways of delivering software updates for embedded 
devices. These techniques do not have security in their design, and hence malicious updates 
from unauthorised sources may change the software leading to mass compromise. 
This research reviewed previous work done using the Public Key Infrastructure in securing 
software updates in legacy systems and led to the development of a secure software updates 
plugin for embedded devices.  
The prototype applies Experimental Research Design and Agile Development Methodology, 
for building of an evaluation platform. It provides opportunities to assess the dissertation 
progress and direction throughout the development lifecycle. This is achieved through 
iterations, coming up with a potentially stable product finally. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study 
An embedded system is a computing system built into a larger system, designed for dedicated 
functions (Papp, Ma, and Buttyan, 2015). It consists of a combination of hardware, software, 
and optionally mechanical parts. Single board computers are often used to build embedded 
systems. Examples include Arduino, Raspberry Pi and Beaglebone (Jaziri, Charaabi & Jelassi, 
2016). 
The computing world is at a crisis point now regarding the security of embedded systems, 
where computing is embedded into the hardware itself, as with the Internet of Things. These 
embedded computers are shipped with vulnerabilities, and there is no good way to patch them 
(Schneier, 2014). With the growth of embedded systems market, more devices are connected 
to the Internet. The Internet of Things will put computers into all sorts of consumer devices. 
Since IoT is a quickly developing and dynamic domain, the implementation of software 
components is liable to continuous changes addressing bug fixes, quality assurance or changed 
requirements. This has not been well addressed as would have been expected.  
To understand this issue, it is critical to understand the embedded systems market. Companies 
such as Broadcom, Qualcomm, and Marvell make specialised computer chips that power 
embedded systems. These chips are cheap, and the profit margins slim. They typically put a 
version of the Linux operating system onto the chips, as well as a bunch of other open-source 
and proprietary components and drivers. They do as little engineering as possible before 
shipping, and there is little incentive to update their board support package until necessary 
(Schneier, 2014). 
IoT devices have a reputation for being insecure at the time when they are manufactured. They 
are often expected to stay active in the field for more than ten years and operate unattended 
with Internet connectivity. Secure software updates are a critical capability for the success and 
growth of the IoT (Grau, 2016). IoT devices must support robust, secure, and scalable software 
and firmware update mechanisms. The historic approach of never upgrading devices in the 
field is not sustainable. 
Public Key Infrastructure has been used to solve software updates security issues such as 
authentication and integrity. For instance, Microsoft Configuration Manager 2007 configures 
software updates to enable certificate revocation lists, which ensures better security against a 
certificate that has been revoked due to various reasons (Microsoft, 2015). 
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This dissertation focuses on using X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (Cooper, 2008) to ensure 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity of software updates for embedded devices. 
Authentication ensures that updates are from authorised sources to authorised systems, 
confidentiality ensures privacy while integrity ensures updates are not altered over the 
communication channels (Kessler and Gary, 2003). 
Initially, these cryptographic solutions have been avoided in IoT security due to limited 
processing capabilities of the embedded devices. However, a trend is developing whereby IoT 
hardware embarks security chips to speed up cryptographic computations, and that provide 
means to store keys securely (NXP, 2016). 
Vast scale Internet of Things (IoT) service deployments keep running on a high number of 
distributed and interconnected computing nodes. These include sensors, actuators, gateways 
and cloud infrastructure. To guarantee the consistent monitoring and control of procedures, 
software updates must be conducted while the nodes are working without losing any sensed 
data or actuator guidelines (Weißbach et al., 2016). 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Most embedded device software is not updated after deployment. This is because chip and 
single board computer manufacturers do not have any incentive, expertise, or even ability to 
patch the software once it is shipped. The chip manufacturer is busy shipping the next version 
of the chip, and the original device manufacturers is busy upgrading its product to work with 
this next chip. Maintaining the older chips and products is not a priority. 
In some cases, new devices have old software. For instance, one survey of common home 
routers found that the software components were four to five years older than the device 
(Heffner, 2010).  
This leaves IoT developers to improvise their own ways of delivering software updates for 
embedded devices. These techniques do not have security in their design, and hence malicious 
updates from unauthorised sources may update the software leading to mass compromise.  
Single board computers are not meant for standard desktop uses that require constant end user 
interaction. They are more suited for projects that require interaction with devices and sensors, 
hence minimal user interaction. This design limitation makes it inefficient for developers to 




1.3 Research Objectives 
1. To investigate how software updates are delivered and identify gaps and challenges in 
updating software in embedded systems, 
2. To investigate the suitability of PKI in delivering software updates securely, 
3. To design and implement an automated PKI based updates plugin for embedded 
systems, and 
4. To validate the PKI based updates plugin for authenticity and integrity. 
1.4 Research Questions 
1. What methods do IoT developers use to deliver software updates, and what are the gaps 
and challenges in these methods? 
2. How has PKI been used to ensure secure updates in other systems? 
3. How can an automated PKI based updates plugin, if implemented, improve the security 
in delivering software updates in embedded systems? 
4. How well does the based updates plugin address the gaps and challenges in delivering 
software updates in embedded systems? 
1.5 Justification of the Study 
This research has led to development of a plugin that enables embedded devices to receive 
updates automatically only from authentic sources, while ensuring that the delivered updates 
remain similar to those in the source. 
This plugin can be integrated in different embedded system software running in single board 
computers. 
1.6 Scope 
This research focus only on network security, specifically on transport layer of the networks 





Chapter 2  Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by reviewing the features and design requirements of embedded systems 
that use single board computers. The follow up sections look at different mechanisms that 
developers use to update their software in single board computers, including remote access and 
local access. The concept of Public Key Infrastructure is also reviewed, and ways in which it 
has been used to ensure secure software updates reviewed. The final section gives conclusions 
on the study based on the literature review by highlighting the research gap and need for an 
automated secure system for updating software in embedded systems. 
2.2 Embedded Systems Design and Requirements 
Embedded systems are important class of electronic systems which can be found everywhere. 
According to Liu et al. (2013), a device that includes a programmable computer but is not itself 
a general-purpose computer is an embedded system. Embedded systems are often built using 
single board computers. 
Single board computers refer to computers complete with processor, RAM, graphics, and other 
peripherals on a single board (Isikdag, 2015). Examples include Raspberry Pi and Beaglebone 
boards. They run most popular embedded operating systems such as ARM architecture Linux 
flavours and Windows Embedded Compact (CE).  
Characteristics of embedded systems include real-time operation, low manufacturing cost, low 
power and resource conscious. 
Single board computers were originally designed for educational projects, embedded 
controllers or for use as development systems (Kruger & Hancke, 2014). Today, numerous 
collection of use single board computers to integrate their functions.  
2.2.1 Size and Cost 
Single board computers are being designed to be smaller and cheaper as time goes by. Ease 
and cost of platform deployment is directly influenced by the physical size and cost of each 
platform (Maksimović et al., 2014). Ease and cost of platform deployment is directly 
influenced by the physical size and cost of each platform.  A reduction in per-platform cost 
will result in the ability to purchase more of them, to deploy a collection network with higher 
density, and to collect more data (Beagle_Board, 2018). Table 2.1 below presents size, weight 




Table 2.1 Comparison of Platforms’ Size, Weight and Cost 
Name Size (mm)  Weight (g)  Cost per node US$ 
Raspberry Pi 85.6 x 53.98 x 17  45  25-35  
Arduino (Uno) 75 x 53 x 15  ~30  30  
BeagleBone Black 86.3 x 53.3  39.68  45  
Phidgets 81.3 x 53,3  60 50 - 200 
Udoo 110 x 85  120-170  99-135  
 
2.2.2 Power and Memory 
The main goal of embedded systems is low power consumption to enable it run in remote or 
unattended environments (Hill, 2003). According to Richardson and Wallace (2012), 
microcontrollers can be powered from a range of sources including computer USB Port or 
powered USB hub (will depend on power output), special wall warts with USB ports, mobile 
phone backup battery (will depend on power output), solar charger for cell phone, and alkaline 
batteries. 
Regarding the storage, the device should have sufficient memory to store the collected data 
(Upton & Halfacree, 2014). Table 2.2 below shows a comparative information on processor, 
random access memory and power rating of various single board computers. 
Table 2.2 Comparison of Platforms’ CPU, Memory and Power 
Name  Processor  RAM Power  
Raspberry Pi  ARM BCM2835  512 – 1000 MB  5V/ USB  
Arduino  
ATMEGA8, ATMEGA168, ATMEGA328, 
ATMEGA1280  
16-32 KB  7-12V /USB  
BeagleBone Black  AM335x 1GHz ARM® Cortex- A8  512 MB  5V  
Phidgets  PhidgetSBC  64 MB  6-15V  
Udoo (Quad)  
Freescale i.MX6Quad, 4 x  
ARM® CortexTM-A9 core Atmel 
SAM3X8E ARM Cortex- M3 CPU  





2.2.3 Flexibility and Communication 
The architecture must be flexible and adaptive in order to be used in wide range of applications 
(Maksimović et al., 2014). Unlike a desktop personal computer, single board computers often 
do not rely on expansion slots for peripheral functions or expansion. They use general purpose 
input and output (GPIO) pins which can accept input and output commands and thus can be 
programmed (Schmidt, 2014). Some devices have a standard RJ45 Ethernet adapter and WiFi 
modules for communication (Vujovic & Maksimovic, 2014). Table 2.3 below analyses the 
connectors and communication interfaces of some devices. 
 
Table 2.3 Comparison of Platforms' Expansion Connectors and communication Interfaces 
Name  Analog inputs  Digital I/O pins USB ports  LAN (Mbit) 
Raspberry Pi  0  14  1-2  10/100/1000 
Arduino  6  14  1 10/100 
BeagleBone Black  6  14  1  10/100 
Phidgets  8  8I+8O  6  - 
Uddo (quad)  14  62+14  5  10/100/1000 
 
2.2.4 Operating Systems and Programming Languages 
The operating systems vary from traditional operating systems in terms of goals and technique 
and each system differs substantially in the approach to memory protection, dynamic 
reprogramming, thread model, real-time features, et cetera (Maksimović et al., 2014). Table 
2.4 below indicates operating systems and programming languages across several devices. 
 
Table 2.4 Operating Systems and Programming Languages 
Name  Board operating system  Programming language  
Raspberry Pi 
Raspbian, Ubuntu, Android, 
ArchLinux, FreeBSD, Fedora, 
RISC OS  
C, C++, Java, Phyton  
Arduino  /  Arduino  
BeagleBone Black Linux Angstrom  Arduino, Python 
Phidgets Linux 
Visual Basic, VB.NET, C#, C/C++, 
Flash/Flex, Java, Labview, Matlab, 
ActionScript 3.0, Cocoa  
Udoo  
Ubuntu, Android, Linux, 
ArchLinux  




2.2.5 Design Requirements and Limitations 
According to Kuchcinski (2017), various design requirements embedded systems has to be 
taken into account. These include: 
Software Design Requirements 
Embedded systems’ software should be flexible enough to adapt to possible or future changes 
in its requirements. This leads to the need to support reconfiguration whereby it can change its 
behaviour by loading different configware code. Also, embedded systems’ software should be 
easy to update. Software update needs to be automatic and secure, without human intervention 
where possible. Finally, the most software needs to be open source or very cheap to gain the 
benefits of collaborative research and continuous improvement. 
Hardware Design Requirements 
Most microprocessors have been designed with limited processing speed capabilities, however, 
if this is increased it will enhance the ability to process more data. 
Embedded systems need to work for long hours without human intervention, hence they need 
to be designed to use as less power as possible. 
Limitations 
Challenges facing embedded systems and IoT at large emanate from the design features 
themselves (Maksimović et al., 2014). These include limited processing speed and need to use 
minimum power. For instance, Raspberry Pi does not allow any connected device to draw more 
than 100mA from any of its USB ports (Richardson & Wallace, 2012). 
Single board computers do not have Basic Input Output System (BIOS). It uses a firmware that 
is closed-source proprietary code programmed into the System on a Chip (SoC) processor, 
which cannot be modified. Upon power-up the firmware will initiate a bootloader on the SD 
card (Kuchcinski, 2017). This makes it very hard to troubleshoot boot problems. 
Single board computers do not have built-in Analog to Digital Converter (ADC). External 
component must be used for analog-digital conversion. Finally, these systems do not have real-
time clock (RTC) with a backup battery. They only depend on network time server to 
synchronise time. 
2.3 Embedded Systems Security 
Security is an important issue because of the roles of embedded systems in many mission and 
safety critical systems. Attacks on cyber systems are proved to cause physical damages 
(Marwedel, 2010). Comparing to conventional IT systems, security of embedded systems is no 
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better due to poor security design and implementation and the difficulty of continuous patching 
(Schneier, 2014).  
According to Bertino (2016), Internet of Things (IoT) systems are vulnerable due to various 
reasons. These include not having well defined perimeters and continuously changing due to 
device and user mobility. IoT systems are highly heterogeneous with respect to communication 
medium and protocols, platforms, and devices. They could be autonomous entities that control 
other IoT devices and might include “things” not designed to be connected to the Internet. Also, 
IoT systems, or portions of them, could be physically unprotected and / or controlled by 
different parties. Unlike smartphone applications, which require permission for installation and 
many user interactions, granular permission requests might not be possible in IoT systems 
because of the large number of devices. 
2.3.1 Recent Attacks 
There is an alarming rise of hacks and breaches exploiting vulnerabilities within the IoT. As 
part of Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructure, embedded systems have suffered major attacks 
recently. These include: 
Linux.Darlloz Worm: In November 2013, Symantec researchers discovered the 
Linux.Darlloz worm, which exploited a PHP vulnerability to propagate to IoT devices such as 
home routers, TV set-top boxes, security cameras, printers, and industrial control systems 
(Wang et al., 2017). The worm comprises a script preloaded with default usernames and 
passwords to crack into vulnerable systems. Once a device is infected, Darlloz starts a HTTP 
Web server on port 58455 in order to spread. Its primary objective was to mine cryptocurrency. 
Symantec estimates that at least 31,716 identified IP addresses in 139 regions were infected by 
Darlloz. 
Mirai Malware: In September 2016, an IoT botnet built from the Mirai malware was 
discovered (Goodin, 2016). The malware uses a list of 62 common default usernames and 
passwords to gain access primarily to home routers, network-enabled cameras, and digital 
video recorders, which usually have less robust protection than other consumer IoT devices. 
According to Bellemans (2017), the botnet was responsible for a 600-Gbps attack targeting 




2.3.2 IoT Vulnerabilities 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) IoT project (2016) lists top 10 
vulnerabilities.  
These include an insecure web interface that can be present when issues such as account 
enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak credentials are present.  
IoT devices may have insufficient authentication/authorisation when weak passwords are used 
or are poorly protected; some default passwords may still be in use.  
Also, IoT devices may run insecure network services that may be susceptible to buffer overflow 
attacks or attacks that create a denial of service condition leaving the device inaccessible to the 
user.  
Lack of transport encryption/integrity verification is common in IoT, which allows data to be 
viewed as it travels over local networks or the Internet.  
IoT devices may have privacy concerns due to the collection of personal data in addition to the 
lack of proper protection of that data is prevalent.  
Insecure cloud interface is another vulnerability that is present when easy to guess credentials 
are used or account enumeration is possible.  
Insecure mobile interface which is present when easy to guess credentials are used or account 
enumeration is possible.  
Insufficient security configurability is present when users of the device have limited or no 
ability to alter its security controls.  
The lack of ability for a device to be updated presents a security weakness on its own, leading 
to insecure software/firmware.  
Finally, physical security weaknesses are present when an attacker can disassemble a device to 
easily access the storage medium and any data stored on that medium. 
2.4 Software Update Techniques 
2.4.1 Secure Shell (SSH) 
Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services 
over an insecure network (Ylonen & Lonvick, 2006). Software developers use SSH to connect 
to single board computer’s command line from a Linux computer, a Mac, or another single 
board computer, without installing additional software.  
To connect to a from a different computer (such as a server), a user types the command below 




If the username and IP address are correct, the system prompts for the password, which should 
be entered for a successful connection to the remote system terminal. Now the user can access 
and edit any software using powerful text editors such as VIM (Oualline, 2001). 
However, SSH does not provide server authentication (Turner, 2014). It is the responsibility of 
the accessed node to verify that the public key is indeed authentic, which presents a challenge. 
2.4.2 Port Forwarding 
Port forwarding is an application of network address translation (NAT) that redirects a 
communication request from one address and port number combination to another while the 
packets are traversing a network gateway, such as a router or firewall (Park, 2011). Through 
port forwarding, developers can access a remote system on the Internet which are behind a 
router. 
However, port forwarding exposes a network port on a private local area network (LAN) to the 
public Internet (Raspberry Pi Foundation, 2018). This is a known security vulnerability and 
must be managed carefully. 
2.4.3 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Clients 
FTP is a protocol for exchanging files over any network supporting the TCP/IP protocol (Postel 
& Reynolds, 1985). FTP clients such as FileZilla (FileZilla® Project, 2018) are used to transfer 
data and edit remote files. 
The FTP protocol is implemented on top of Telnet, which suffers from serious security issues 
that have limited its usefulness in environments where the network cannot be fully trusted (Boe 
& Altman, 2002). 
2.4.4 Local Access 
The developer physically accesses the system and logs in to the operating system to update any 
software (Raspberry Pi Foundation, 2018). 
 
2.5 Recommendations for Software Updates 
Software updates are needed to patch software that has bugs, which intruders any use to exploit 
remotely. Also, updates are necessary to deploy new features and improve performance. 
Although many approaches have been proposed in the past to secure embedded systems 
(Kleidermacher & Kleidermacher, 2012), various aspects such as cost consideration and 
deployment scale make it very difficult to secure them. 
According to Simmonds (2016), requirements for software updates include being secure to 
prevents the device from being hijacked, being robust to prevent an update from rendering the 
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device unusable, being atomic such that an update must be installed completely or not at all, 
having a failsafe feature such that one can deploy fall-back mode if all else fails, and being 
able to preserve persistent state. 
Grau (2016) outlined some mechanisms and issues to be addressed by a scalable, secure 
software standard. These include software signing and validation (including the role of 
certificates, keys or other authentication mechanisms), use of transport protocols for 
distribution of the software, encryption of the software while being distributed, and scheduling 
and distribution of the software updates. For example, a staged rollout of software updates may 
be desirable so that any issues discovered in the field that escaped lab testing can be found and 
reported before most of the devices are updated.  
Another mechanism is to enable the user to have control over software updates. For many 
devices, the user should be allowed some discretion over when updates occur so as not to 
interrupt their use of the device, or the device needs to be aware of how the update will impact 
its operation. This needs to be balanced with the need to ensure that updates occur. Finally, the 
role of the gateway in caching and distributing software updates needs to be defined for IoT 
devices that connect via a gateway. 
2.6 Public Key Infrastructure 
2.6.1 Overview 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the service framework that is used to support large-scale 
public key-based technologies (Salomaa, 2013). According to Salomaa (2013), PKI provides 
the base for security services such as encryption, which refers to the process of enciphering 
data into cipher text in such a way that only authorised parties can access it and those who are 
not authorised cannot, authentication, which refers to the process of ensuring that any 
messages received were sent from the perceived origin, and  nonrepudiation, which the 
process of ensuring that the original source of a secured message cannot deny having produced 
the message. 
A PKI makes use of certificates issued by certificate authorities (CA) to operate. A CA refers 
to a trusted third party that signs the public keys of entities in a PKI-based system. A certificate 
refers to a document, which binds together the name of the entity and its public key, which has 
been signed by the CA (Cooper, 2008). 
A PKI facilitates highly scalable trust relationships (Rea, 2015). PKIs can be further scaled 
using a hierarchy of CAs with a root CA signing the identity certificates of subordinate CAs. 
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According to w3techs web technology surveys (2018), many vendors offer CA servers as a 
managed service or as an end-user product. These include VeriSign, Entrust Technologies, and 
GoDaddy. Organisations may also implement private PKIs using Microsoft Server or Open 
SSL. 
PKI has been standardised to allow interoperability across a wide variety of applications and 
vendors (Gigovic, 2014). In the early 1990s, RSA Security Inc. devised and published a set of 
standards that are known as Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS). While not true 
industry standards, as they were specified and maintained by a single organisation, several of 
the standards have been accepted into the standards track processes of recognised standards 
organisations (Kaliski & Redwood, 1993). Some of the PKCSs include: 
1. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard 
2. PKCS #3: D-H Key Agreement Standard 
3. PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Standard 
4. PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard 
5. PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard 
6. PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard 
7. PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard 
8. PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard 
9. PKCS #13: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standard 
10. PKCS #15: Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard 
2.6.2 X.509 
X.509 is an International Telecommunication Union Standardisation Sector (ITU-T) standard 
for PKI which specifies, among other things, the formats for identity certificates and certificate 
validation algorithms (Cooper, 2008). The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) formed the 
PKIX working group to support standards development of X.509. 
Currently, digital identity certificates use the X.509 version 3 structure (Slagell, Bonilla, & 
Yurcik, 2006) with the following fields: Version, serial number, algorithm ID, issuer, validity 
(not before and not after), subject, subject public key info (public key algorithm and subject 
public key), issuer unique identifier (optional), subject unique identifier (optional), extensions 





2.6.3 Public Key Infrastructure Operations 
1. Certificate Enrollment 
To obtain an identity certificate, a system administrator will enroll with the PKI (Cooper, 
2008). The first step is to obtain the CA’s identity certificate. The next step is to create a 
certificate signing request (CSR), following PKCS #10. The CSR contains the identity 
information that is associated with the enrolling system, which can include data such as the 
system name, the organisation to which the system belongs, and location information (Vacca, 
2013). Most importantly, the enrolling system’s public key is included with the CSR. 
Depending on the circumstance, the CA administrator may need to contact the enroller and 
verify the data before the request can be approved. If the request is approved, the CA will take 
the identity data from the CSR, and add in the CA-specified data, such as the certificate serial 
number, the validity dates, and the signature algorithm, to complete the X.509 v3 certificate 
structure. It will then sign the certificate by hashing the certificate data and encrypting the hash 
with its private key. The signed certificate is then made available to the enrolling system. Figure 
2.1 illustrates this process. 
 
Figure 2.1 Certificate Enrolment 




2. Authentication Using Certificates 
Systems that need to validate the identity certificate of other systems will have the root CA 
certificate (Ford, 1998). They will use the CA’s public key to validate the signature on any 
certificate they receive. It is also important to understand that the certificate does not so much 
identify the entity of the peer. It only identifies the valid public key of the peer (Wang & Zhang, 
2010). To be sure that the peer is the entity that is identified in the certificate, a system must 
challenge the peer to prove that it has the private key that is associated with the validated public 
key. For example, a message can be encrypted with the validated public key and sent to the 
peer. If the peer can successfully decrypt the message, then the peer must have the associated 
private key and is therefore the system that is identified by the digital certificate. Figure 2.2 
illustrates this process. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Authentication Using Certificates  
Source: Complementar, (2016) 
3. Certificate Revocation 
Digital certificates can be revoked if keys are thought to be compromised, or if the business 
use of the certificate calls for revocation (Jayaprakash, 2015). If keys are thought to be 
compromised, generating new keys forces the creation of a new digital certificate, rendering 
the old certificate invalid and a candidate for revocation.  
On the other hand, a consultant might obtain a digital certificate for VPN access into the 
corporate network only during the contract. During the SSL handshake a server invokes 
OCSP/CRL protocols to verify that the client’s X509 Certificate is not revoked by its issuer. 
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OCSP and CRL must to make a http call to servers at CA to do the verification (Palihakkara, 
2014).  The CA servers respond with the revocation status of the certificates.  
The SSL connection cannot be established any further if the response indicate that the 
certificates are revoked. Figure 2.3 illustrates this process. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Certificate Revocation 
Source: Palihakkara, (2014) 
2.7 Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security (SSL / TLS) 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is an encryption technology for the web to provide secure 
transactions, such as the transmission of credit card numbers for e-commerce (Freier, Karlton, 
& Kocher, 1996). Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a successor to SSL. SSL was developed 
by Netscape in the 1990s to provide secure transactions between web browsers and web servers 
in support of commerce over the Internet. SSL became a de facto standard, but it has since been 
made obsolete by TLS which is standardised by the IETF. TLS version 1.0 was defined in RFC 
2246 in 1999 and provided a standards-based upgrade to SSL version 3.0. TLS continues to 
evolve with TLS 1.3 in draft as of February 2015. Modern systems implement TLS. 
TLS uses PKI to authenticate peer systems and public key cryptography to facilitate the 
exchange of session keys that are used to encrypt the SSL session (Turner, 2014). Many 
applications use TLS to provide authentication and encryption. The most widely used 
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application is HTTPS (Rescorla, 2000). Other well-known applications that were using poor 
authentication and no encryption were modified to be transported within TLS. Examples 
include SMTP (Hoffman, 2002), LDAP (Hodges, Morgan, & Wahl, 2000), and POP3 
(Newman, 1999). 
Figure 2.4 depicts the steps that are taken in the negotiation of a new TLS connection between 
a web browser and a web server. 
 
Figure 2.4 Cryptographic architecture of SSL and TLS  
Source: Rescorla, (2000) 
2.8 Cipher Suites 
A cipher suite is a set of algorithms that help secure a network connection that uses SSL/TLS 
(Steiner et al., 2001). An SSL/TLS cipher suite is used to define a set of cryptographic 
algorithms including the authentication and key exchange algorithms (such as RSA), 
encryption algorithm (such as Advanced Encryption Standard - AES), message authentication 
code algorithm (such as SHA), and the PRF. The cipher suites are described in RFC 5288 and 
RFC 5289. 
When a TLS connection is established, a TLS handshake occurs. Within the TLS handshake, 
a client hello and a server hello message are passed. First, the client sends a list of the cipher 
suites that it supports, in order of preference. Then the server replies with the cipher suite that 
it has selected from the client's list. 
When a TLS connection is established, a TLS handshake occurs. Within the TLS handshake, 
a client hello and a server hello message are passed. First, the client sends a list of the cipher 
suites that it supports, in order of preference. Then the server replies with the cipher suite that 
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it has selected from the client's list (Polk, McKay, & Chokhani, 2014). Figure 2.5 below depicts 
part of a packet capture (PCAP) with a TLS client that is presenting the set of cipher suites that 
it can support to the server. 
 
Figure 2.5 PCAP listing the cipher suites that client supports  
Source: Nath, (2015) 
The structure and use of the cipher suite concept are defined in the documents that define the 
protocol (RFC 5246 for TLS version 1.2). This RFC defines mandatory cipher suites that must 
be implemented by all TLS-compliant applications. An example of cipher suite is 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. It uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman exchange (ECDHE) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithms (ECDSAs) for 
authentication and key exchange, instead of using RSA.  
CDHE_ECDSA is the authentication and key exchange algorithms. ECDHE_ECDSA is used 
to determine how the client and server will authenticate and establish the pre-master key during 
the TLS handshake. In this case, both the client and the server will derive the identical pre-
master key using the Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters (sent in the additional 
ServerKeyExchange message). The pre-master key is then used to derive the master key and 
the session-specific keys. With DH key exchanges, for the client to authenticate the server, the 
server will sign the DH parameters that are contained in ServerKeyExchange message with the 
server’s private key. The client verifies the signature with the server's public key in the server's 
certificate. Only if the signature is valid, the client will proceed with the TLS handshake. 
AES_256_GCM is the bulk encryption algorithm. Galois Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of 
operation for an authenticated symmetric key cryptographic block ciphers that has been widely 
adopted because of its efficiency and performance. GCM is an authenticated encryption 
algorithm that is designed to provide both data authenticity and confidentiality. 
18 
 
SHA-384 is used for the pseudorandom function. Since an authenticated encryption mode 
(GCM) is used, the messages neither have nor require a message authentication code. 
The pseudorandom function is used to generate the keying materials that are used during the 
TLS session. 
2.9 Systems Using PKI in Securing Updates in Other Cases 
Modio 
This is a software stack developed by Modio AB. It is based around embedded Linux and IoT, 
focusing on robustness, security, and integration tools. The stack consists of distribution and 
upgrades, certificate management, serial communications, data logging and frontend 
visualisations. 
All Modio AB embedded devices run Modio Embedded OS, that incorporates the features 
ensuring secure, automatic and continuous updates of embedded and IoT systems (Modio, 
2018). Caramel is Modio’s CA system that manages TLS certificates, updates and refreshing. 
2.10 Conclusion 
Experts recommend certificate-based methods to secure IoT devices because certificates 
support proper security measures like the implementation of multi-factor authentication. More 
specifically, TLS supports two-way certificate-based authentication. For instance, device-to-
server, or device-to-device authentication. 
Existing solutions have been Operating System depended and not meant to integrate with 
custom applications in different single board computers (Modio, 2018). 
Developers need a light weight tool that they can integrate with their application scripts for 
secure updates. This has been an ignored area and its implementation will help improve the 
security of IoT. This dissertation will make use of research by Grau (2016) and Gigovic (2014) 
as guidelines in coming up with the software updates plugin. 
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Chapter 3  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research methodology that was used. Focus falls on detailing the 
approach taken in doing the research that influenced the development of the solution.   
3.2 Research Design 
The selected approach is partly theoretical in nature through literature review and the 
development of a tool used to validate the proposed solution. A review of relevant research 
documents on embedded systems design and requirements, software update techniques and the 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was sufficient to answer the first two objectives of this study. 
The theoretical research was intended to provide a deeper theoretical understanding of the 
research area. This formed a basis for the development and validation of the proposed solution. 
3.3 System Development Methodology 
This study sought to design, develop and test a tool that will deliver software updates to 
embedded devices in a secure way. The research used Agile Development Methodology, which 
provided opportunities to assess the dissertation progress and direction throughout the 
development lifecycle.  
According to a Manifesto for Agile Software Development signed by Beck et al. (2001), agile 
development is a better way of developing software that promotes sustainable development. 
Scrum is the most widely used lightweight process framework for agile development in 
completing complex projects and innovative scope of work. This is achieved through iterations, 
coming up with a potentially stable product finally, as illustrated in figure 3.1 below: 
 
Figure 3.1 Agile Development Methodology  




The study took necessary steps to ensure that the processes to be undertaken are outlined clearly 
to achieve the research objectives. This involved how the problem was addressed in in different 
establishments and to come up with new ways of solving the problem. 
3.3.2 Requirements Analysis 
In this step, data collected through analysing systems in planning step was analysed. This 
helped in formulating the requirements of the systems that was built. The stage also included 
the creation of the system architecture. The design step involved coming up with the 
application designs based on the requirements gathered. 
3.3.3 System Design 
Functional Oriented Design (FOD) techniques were used to refine the functional requirements 
identified during system analysis and to decompose the design into sets of interacting units 
where each unit has clearly defined functions. 
Unified Modelling Language (UML) was used to specify, visualise, construct, and document 
the artifacts of the system. 
Use Case diagrams were used to show required usages of a system under design or analysis 
and to capture what the system is supposed to do. 
System Sequence Diagrams were used to illustrate a scenario of a use case, the events that 
external actors generate, their order, and possible inter-system event. 
These artifacts were developed by use of Draw.io tool. 
3.3.4 Implementation 
The development tools chosen for this study have different component which help in achieving 
certain functionalities. Python programming language was chosen because it provided several 
libraries which can be used to achieve low level functionalities and has many resources 
supported by a large community. Shell script was used to automate the tool functionalities, run 
cron jobs and execute Python scripts. 
PKI module followed the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) guidelines 
for the selection, configuration, and use of TLS implementations (NIST Special Publication 
800-52). Transport Layer Security (TLS) provides mechanisms to protect data during 
electronic dissemination across the Internet. This Special Publication provides guidance to the 
selection and configuration of TLS protocol implementations while making effective use of 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and NIST-recommended cryptographic 
algorithms (Chernick et al., 2005). 
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Git was used as the version control system (VCS) for recording and tracking changes to 
software code over time so that we can recall specific versions later (Chacon & Straub, 2014). 
3.3.5 Testing 
System testing was guided by open web application security project (OWASP) testing guide 
version 4.  The tests included testing for functional requirements, sensitive data transmitted in 
clear-text, testing for weak SSL/TLS ciphers / protocols / keys vulnerabilities, and testing 
server SSL certificate validity. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The chapter highlighted the methodology that was adopted in undertaking the study. The 
methods for data collection and analysis are proposed to guide the researcher in making 
deductions from the evidence to be collected and thus answer the research questions. The tools 
employed are also highlighted. If any of the phases changes during the implementation stage, 





Chapter 4  System Design and Architecture 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter presents a detailed view of how the auto update plugin was designed. The 
researcher used the use case diagram, data flow diagrams, system sequence diagram and data 
modelling to illustrate different aspects of the auto update plugin. 
4.2 System Architecture 
The system is based on the following architecture: 
4.2.1 General Architecture 
The general architecture of the system is a client server model is ideal in a situation where 
multiple single board devices need to be updated regularly. A trust model is used whereby the 
server and client devices register with Certificate Authority (CA) server, which verifies the 
device identity. The trust model follows the Public Key Infrastructure x.509 standard. 
An overview of how the application works is shown in figure 4.1. The client establishes a 
secure connection to the server using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to avoid security 
breaches such as Man in the Middle Attack (MITM). It checks if the server has software 
updates using sha256 hashes at predefined time intervals. If there are updates, the client 
downloads the updates (not the whole application). This ensures efficient bandwidth usage by 
avoiding downloading the whole application code. 
 




Step 1: TLS Handshake (Server Authentication) 
This is the first step that takes place after the update.sh script is triggered by crontab daemon. 
The main goal of this step is to authenticate the remote server and open a secure TLS 
connection between the client and the server. Subsection 4.2.2 discusses this process in detail. 
Step 2: Check and Download Updates 
The second step involves two processes, client checking if there are updates in the server, and 
if available the server transmits the updates only to the client. A version control system is used 
to ensure that only the updates are transmitted to ensure efficient use of bandwidth. Subsection 
4.2.3 discusses this process in detail. 
Step 3: Close TLS Session 
The third step involves termination of the client – server connection. This is done 
immediately after the updates are successfully delivered the client. The client sends a 
close_notify message to server notifying it that it will not send any more requests during that 
session. Any data received after a closure alert is ignored. 
Step 4: Apply Updates on Local Repository 
The fourth step is to update the intended software. The fetched updates are merged with the 
application code using git merge utility. 
4.2.2 Authentication 
The client authenticates the server prior to checking and downloading the updates. This is 
indented to ensure that rogue servers cannot update the client devices. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
TLS handshake process that authenticates the server. In this model, only the server certificate 
is verified. We do not need to authenticate the client since the server can only be accessed by 
trusted devices in a local area network (LAN) or a VPN. This is a good model for the resource 
constrained single board computers. 
The certificate authority (CA) is locally implemented to sign server certificate, that is provided 
for verification during the TLS handshake. The devices negotiate supported cipher suites and 
agrees on which one to use. The process ends after the devices calculate a symmetric key that 




Figure 4.2 TLS Authentication - Handshake Protocol 
Step 1: ClientHello Message 
The client first sends ClientHello Message when it first connects to a server. The ClientHello 
message includes a variable-length session identifier, cipher suite list, and a list of 
compression algorithms supported by the client, ordered according to the client's preference. 
Structure of this message is indicated in appendix A. 
After sending the ClientHello message, the client waits for a ServerHello message.  Any 
handshake message returned by the server, except for a HelloRequest, is treated as a fatal 
error. 
Step 2: ServerHello Message 
The server will send this message in response to a ClientHello message when it was able to 
find an acceptable set of algorithms. The ServerHello Message contains server_version which 
is the lower of that suggested by the client in the client hello and the highest supported by the 
server, server random, session_id which is the identity of the session corresponding to this 
connection, cipher_suite which is the single cipher suite selected by the server from the list in 
ClientHello.cipher_suites, compression_method which is the single compression algorithm 
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selected by the server from the list in ClientHello.compression_methods and a list of 
extensions. Structure of this message is indicated in appendix A. 
Step 3: Server Certificate 
This message conveys the server's certificate chain to the client. The certificate must be 
appropriate for the negotiated cipher suite's key exchange algorithm and any negotiated 
extensions. Structure of this message is indicated in appendix A. 
Step 4: Pre-master Key 
In this step, the client sends the Client Key Exchange Message that sets the premaster secret, 
either by direct transmission of the RSA-encrypted secret or by the transmission of Diffie-
Hellman parameters that will allow each side to agree upon the same premaster secret. 
Structure of this message is indicated in appendix A. 
Step 5: Pre-master Key Decryption 
If RSA is being used for key agreement and authentication, the server uses its private key to 
decrypt the 48-byte premaster secret. 
Step 6: Calculating Symmetric Key 
The symmetric key is the master secret that will be used to encrypt and decrypt 
communication between the client and the server. For all key exchange methods, the same 
algorithm is used to convert the pre_master_secret into the master_secret. Structure of this 
operation is indicated in appendix A. 
Step 7: Exchanging Finished Messages 
Handshake Finalization Messages are exchanged between the client and server to indicate 
successful TLS connection. Structure of this message is indicated in appendix A. 
4.2.3 Update Checking and Delivery 
After a predefined period, the client checks if there are any updates at the server. The updates 
are implemented in a git server. Git is a version control framework that ensures changes to 
code are tracked and efficiently coordinate work on the code amongst multiple developers. The 
git server has a remote repository that is a copy of the client software. It is updated by the 
developers if need be, and such changes are expected to reflect on client devices. To support 
this, the client device has a local repository that is a replica of the remote repository. The client 
periodically checks if there are any changes in the remote repository and downloads them by 
using the git fetch command. It then applies the updates to the running application through git 




Figure 4.3 Update Checking and Delivery 
4.3 Use Case 
Figure 4.4 is a use case diagram that illustrates the major interactions taking place between the 
various subsystems and actors in the developed prototype. 
 
Figure 4.4 Use Case Diagram 
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4.3.1 Use Case 1 Run Update.sh script 
Table 4.1 Run Update.sh Script Use Case 
Use Case Name: Run Update.sh script 
Description: This use case contains instructions to execute TLS authentication scripts, 
updates checking, download and installation to the local software. 
Primary Actor: Crontab 
Secondary Actor: None 
Include Use Cases: TLS Authentication 
Download Updates 
Install Updates 
Extend Use Cases: None 
Preconditions: Predefined time interval must have lapsed 
Post Conditions: The system establishes a secure connection to the git server 
Main Flow: The system triggers TLS Authentication use case and waits for it to complete 
The system triggers Download Updates use case and waits for updates to be 
downloaded 
The system merges updates with the software 
Alternative Flows: Failed authentication 
The system restarts TLS Authentication 
Maximum 3 attempts allowed 






4.3.2 Use Case 2 TLS Authentication 
Table 4.2 TLS Authentication Use Case 
Use Case Name: TLS Authentication 
Description: This use case contains procedures for the system to establish a secure 
connection to the git server using Transport Layer Security (TLS). The 
certificate authority (CA) signs server certificate, that is provided for 
verification during the TLS handshake. 
Primary Actor: None 
Secondary Actor: Certificate Authority 
Git Server 
Include Use Cases: Verify Server Certificate 
Extend Use Cases: Abort Connection 
Preconditions: Server must have a certificate 
Post Conditions: The system establishes a secure TLS connection to the git server 
Main Flow: System sends ClientHello message to server that includes TLS Protocol, 
client's random value, supported cipher suites, suggested compression 
methods. 
Server replies with ServerHello message that includes chosen TLS protocol 
version, server random value, CipherSuite, and compression method. 
Server sends its certificate to system (client). 
Client verifies server certificate using the certificate authority. 
System encrypts pre-master key with server’s public key and sends it to 
server. 
Server decrypts the pre-master key using its private key. 
Both system and server calculate a symmetric key using the pre-master key. 
Both system and server exchange Finished Messages encrypted with 
symmetric key. 
Alternative Flows: Invalid certificate 





4.3.3 Use Case 3 Download Updates 
Table 4.3 Download Updates Use Case 
Use Case Name: Download Updates 
Description: This use case downloads the changes from remote repository in 
authenticated git server to the local repository. 
Primary Actor: None 
Secondary Actor: Git Server 
Include Use Cases: Check Updates 
Extend Use Cases: Already up-to Date 
Preconditions: Established secure connection between system/client and server 
Post Conditions: Latest version of local repository 
Main Flow: System imports commits from the remote repository into local repository. 
System stores resulting commits as remote branches. 
Alternative Flows: git fetch gets interrupted by connectivity issues 






4.4 Sequence Diagram 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Sequence Diagram 
Issue Certificate: A trusted global Certificate Authority signs and issues a public certificate 
to the GitHub server. The client already knows this CA since it is preinstalled in the operating 
system by the manufacturer. The client will validate this certificate every time during the 
TLS handshake. 
Establish TLS Connection: The UpdateScript starts by establishing a secure communication 
channel between the system and the GitHub server. OpenSSL commands are used. This is 
achieved through TLS handshake discussed in section 4.2.2. 
Fetch Updates: The UpdateScript checks for updates in the Github server. If there are no 
updates, the connection is closed up-to the next scheduled update check time. 
Send Updates: If updates are available, the GitHub server transmits only the changes to the 
local repository. These are send in encrypted format such that privacy and integrity are 
maintained. 
Merge Updates: The local repository is checked for consistencies, and if everything matches 
the remote repository, changes are merged to the indented code.  
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Chapter 5  System Implementation and Testing 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the system implementation procedures. This includes the 
implementation environment, main functions of the prototype and system testing which 
describes the kind of tests carried out and the intended results. The relevant screenshots of the 
prototype are provided.  
5.2 Software Environment 
The system is a network application using the client-server model. It is implemented on 
Raspbian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch) which is a Debian distribution. The system was built in 
different phases using several programming / scripting languages and software that include: 
5.2.1 Bash Programming 
Bash Programming is the art of creating shell scripts designed to be run by the Unix shell, a 
command-line interpreter. The system uses scripts to set up the environment, run processes, 
and audit the system through log maintenance. 
5.2.2 OpenSSL 
OpenSSL is an open source implementation of the SSL/TLS protocol. It provides a command 
line application to perform a wide variety of cryptography tasks, such as creating and handling 
certificates and related files.  
5.2.3 Python Programming Language 
Python is an interpreted high-level programming language for general-purpose programming. 
It has low-level capabilities which makes it faster than other high-level languages (Monk, 
2015). Python was selected because it works well in small devices that have limited 
computational power and memory. 
5.2.4 Wireshark  
Wireshark is a free and open source packet analyser that enables visibility of network activity 
at packet level. In this research, it is used to capture traffic between the Raspberry Pi and the 
GitHub Server and inspect the packets’ Secure Sockets Layer header. 
5.2.5 Nmap 
Nmap free security scanner, port scanner, and network exploration tool that was originally 
written by Gordon Lyon. It is compatible with all major operating systems. It has inbuilt scripts 
used for specialised scanning and vulnerability analysis. In this research, it is used to test 





cURL is a command line tool and library for transferring data with URLs using various 
protocols. In this research, it is used to test if the server supports unsecure communication via 
HTTP. 
5.2.7 ShellCheck 
ShellCheck is a GPLv3 static analysis tool that gives warnings and suggestions for bash/sh 
shell scripts. In this research, it is used for code analysis to point out and clarify typical syntax 
issues that cause a shell to give cryptic error messages, to point out and clarify typical 
intermediate level semantic problems that cause a shell to behave strangely and counter-
intuitively and to point out subtle caveats, corner cases and pitfalls that may cause an advanced 
user's otherwise working script to fail under future circumstances. 
5.3 Hardware Environment 
Central Processing Unit:  4× ARM Cortex-A53, 1.2GHz 
Random Access Memory:  1GB LPDDR2 (900 MHz) 
Network Interface:   10/100 Ethernet or 2.4GHz 802.11n wireless 
5.4 Set-up and Configuration 
This is the only task where the end user interacts with the system. Several shell scripts are used 
to configure the auto-update plugin. To make this user friendly, Whiptail, a program that allows 
shell scripts to display dialog boxes to the user for informational purposes is used to get input 
from the user in a friendly way. This information includes the URL to remote repository, the 
local software to update, and the frequency of updates. The screenshots below illustrate this 
process: 
The welcome message shown in appendix B is displayed upon running the installer. The user 
should press return button to proceed. 
The user is prompted to input the local directory of the software to be updated as sown in 
appendix B. If it is not available, it will be created and cloned from the cloud. 
The user is prompted to select the frequency of update checking and downloading as shown in 
appendix B. 
Finally, the user is prompted to enter the URL to the remote git repository from which the 
updated will be pulled from as shown in appendix B. 
Appendix B indicates the installation and configuration summary of the auto update plugin. 
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5.5 Functions of the Prototype 
5.5.1 Opening Secure TLS Connection 
The software is designed to communicate with the remote server through a secure TLS tunnel. 
This is done before update checking and downloading. The client, a Raspberry Pi single board 
computer (ipv4 address: 10.9.41.47) exchanges TLS handshake messages with the server, a git 
server (ipv4 address: 192.30.41.47) to establish a secure connection. 
Line 7 in code snippet in appendix C shows the openssl command to create a TLS connection 
to github server via the standard port 443. 
After the TCP three-way handshake, the TLS handshake begins by Client Hello message from 
the Raspberry Pi specifying, among other information, 57 cipher suites that it can support. 
Figure 5.1 shows a Wireshark packet capture with the Client Hello TLS packet from the client 
(IP address 10.9.41.47) to the GitHub server (IP address 192.30.253.113). The Secure Socket 
Layer record shows the information about the handshake protocol Client Hello message. The 
client supports TLS 1.2 and can accept the listed 57 cipher suites. 
 
Figure 5.1 Client Hello Packet 
The next step of the TLSv1.2 Record Layer Handshake Protocol is the Server Hello from the 
server (IP address 192.30.253.113) to the client (IP address 10.9.41.47) as indicated in the 
Wireshark packet capture shown in figure 5.2 below. Some notable items in the Server Hello 
message include the TLS version (TLS 1.2), Cipher Suite that will be used for the data 




Figure 5.2 Server Hello Packet 
The server (IP address 192.30.253.113) then sends its certificate signed by a trusted Certificate 
Authority to the client (IP address 10.9.41.47) as indicated in the Wireshark packet capture 
shown in figure 5.3 below. The TLS record layer indicates a certificate. The handshake protocol 
supports EC Diffie-Hellman server key exchange algorithm. The certificate is signed by sha256 
algorithm with RSA encryption. The certificate also contains the Public Key of the server that 
will be used to encrypt keying material. 
 
Figure 5.3 Server Certificate Exchange Packet 
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This certificate not only ensures the identity of the server, but also proves it. Its issued to 
github.com by DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA (DigiCert Inc) as shown in 
appendix C. The Raspberry Pi is configured with trusted certificates which are globally 
maintained. These are in “/etc/ssl/cert” directory. Appendix C illustrates this. 
All application data exchanged is encrypted (HTTP via TLS), including alerts. After the 
Raspberry Pi fetches updates, the connection is closed using TCP FIN messages as shown in 
appendix D. 
5.5.2 Checking and Downloading and Merging Updates from Remote 
Repository 
Updates are fetched from a remote repository and integrated with a local branch. The utility 
‘git pull’ is shorthand for ‘git fetch’ followed by ‘git merge FETCH_HEAD’ utilities. 
Therefore, ‘git pull’ runs ‘git fetch’ with the given parameters and calls ‘git merge’ to merge 
the retrieved branch heads into the current branch. 
Line 7 of the code snippet in Appendix D is a ‘git pull’ command that includes a fetch utility 
to check for and download updates from the remote repository. 
The updates are send from server in encrypted data packets, as illustrated in Appendix D. If 
there are no updates, nothing is downloaded. This is a bandwidth saving feature of the git pull 
command. Appendix D summarises these operations. 
5.5.3 Updating the Local Repository 
The git pull command contains a merge utility that incorporates the downloaded updates into 
the local software repository so that it is in the latest version. 
5.6 System Testing 
Several tests were done on the auto-update plugin to ensure that it is meets its functional 
requirements and is secure. Section 2.3.2 outlines the top 10 IoT vulnerabilities which must be 
addressed for IoT applications and equipment. Due the headless nature of the auto-update 
plugin, some vulnerabilities such as those relating to user interface and stored data are not 
applicable. 
The auto update plugin is a network application that transmits sensitive data through the 
network. This data must be protected. Despite the availability of high grade ciphers, some 
misconfigurations in the server can be exploited to force the use of weak ciphers, creating a 
vulnerability that attackers can exploit to gain access to the intended secure communication 
channel or cause a Denial of Service (DoS). The testing procedures focused on system 
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functionalities, TLS ciphers and transport layer protection. Table 5.1 shows in detail the manual 
test plan. 
5.6.1 Test Plan 
Table 5.1 Test Plan 
Item Value 
Objectives To define the tools to be used throughout the testing process. 
To communicate to the responsible parties the items to be tested, set 
expectations around schedule. 
To define environmental needs. 
To define how the tests will be conducted. 
Test Items Functional Testing 
Structural Testing 
The Transport Layer Security Algorithms. 







Approach Manual tests will be carried out on all the modules of the application by different 
users.  
Test Cases were the developed with step by step procedures for testing the 
features.  
The sample target application to be updated by the system will be availed to the 
testers via a public GitHub account. 
Users participating in the testing will fill in prepared manual test cases with the 
results of the testing.  
Each user is required to repeat testing each module at least three times using the 
same datasets to ensure the results are repeatable.  
Item Pass/Fail 
Criteria 
All core functionality of the systems should function as expected and outlined in 
the individual test cases.  
There must be no critical defects found and an end user must be able to 
complete a purchase cycle successfully and initiate a refund without any errors.  
95% of all test cases should pass and no failed cases should be crucial to the end-
user’s ability to use the application. 
Suspension 
Criteria 
Testing should be paused immediately if either part of the system is found 
vulnerable to a security breach. 
Test 
Deliverables 







Raspberry Pi 3 device with Raspbian Stretch version 4.14 operating system 
Internet access 




Table 5.2 shows the test use case summary results filled in by the users testing the tool. From the actual results obtained, it is evident that all test 
cases succeeded and that the tool is functioning properly as intended. 
Table 5.2 Test Case 
ID Test Case and Procedure Expected Results Actual Results Pass 
/Fail 
1 Test Name: Data encryption 
Test Procedure: 
Open the CLI 
Type command ‘curl -kis 
http://github.com’ to check if the site 
allows unencrypted traffic 
Press ‘return’ button 
 
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently 
Content-length: 0 
Location: https://github.com/ 




2 Test Name: SSL/TLS ciphers 
Test Procedure: 
Open the CLI 
Install Nmap ‘apt-get install nmap’ 
Type command ‘nmap -sV --reason -
PN -n --top-ports 100 
www.github.com’ to confirm if 
ssl/https services are running. 
Press ‘return’ button 
Type command ‘nmap --script ssl-
cert,ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 
www.github.com’ to check certificate 
information, weak ciphers and 
SSL/TLS. 
Press ‘return’ button 







Subject Alternative Name: DNS:github.com, 
DNS:www.github.com 
Issuer: commonName=DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation 
Server CA/organizationName=DigiCert Inc/countryName=US 
Public Key type: rsa 
Public Key bits: 2048 
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 
Not valid before: 2016-03-10T00:00:00 
Not valid after:  2018-05-17T12:00:00 
MD5:   b890 fabe 8bb6 3625 899e 1e00 4981 4797 
SHA-1: d79f 0761 10b3 9293 e349 ac89 845b 0380 c19e 2f8b 







Subject Alternative Name: DNS:github.com, 
DNS:www.github.com 
Issuer: commonName=DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation 
Server CA/organizationName=DigiCert Inc/countryName=US 
Public Key type: rsa 
Public Key bits: 2048 
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 
Not valid before: 2016-03-10T00:00:00 
Not valid after:  2018-05-17T12:00:00 
MD5:   b890 fabe 8bb6 3625 899e 1e00 4981 4797 




3 Test Name: SSL/TLS certificates 
Test Procedure: 
Open the CLI 
Type command ‘curl --insecure -v 
https://www.github.com 2>&1 | awk 
'BEGIN { cert=0 } /^\* Server 
certificate:/ { cert=1 } /^\*/ { if (cert) 
print }'’ to validate ssl certificate. 
 Press ‘return’ button 
 SSL certificate verify ok  SSL certificate verify ok Pass 
4 Test Name: Source code 
Test Procedure: 
Open a web browser 
Go to URL 
‘https://www.shellcheck.net/’ 
Paste the script code in the Ace editor 
to find bugs 
Check the ShellCheck Output 
$ shellcheck .\update.sh 
No issues detected 
$ shellcheck .\update.sh 




5.6.2 Functional Testing 
Functional testing checks if core requirements and functionalities are met. 
1. Automate update process: This is achieved by setting up crontab that will be running at a 
predefined time interval. An administrator can increase or reduce the time interval 
depending on the organisation requirements. The cron code below implements this feature:  
00 09-18 * * * sh /home/pi/AutoUpdatePlugin/update.sh 2>/home/pi/logs/cronlog 
2. Create a secure TLS connection: The proper implementation of TLS 1.2 ensures that this 
functional requirement is met. The tool instantiates a secure TLS connection using the 
following openssl command: 
echo | openssl s_client -connect www.github.com:443 2>&1 | sed --quiet '/-BEGIN 
CERTIFICATE-/,/-END CERTIFICATE-/p' > github.crt 
3. Check and download updates: This is achieved through the following git code: 
git pull https://github.com/vmalombe/Pi_LED_Blinking.git 
5.6.3 Structural Testing 
In structural testing, tests are derived from the knowledge of the software's structure or internal 
implementation. Structural testing is critical because it is meant to secure updates relating to 
embedded systems, that usually control critical systems. The use of an existing cryptography 
framework helped in reducing the number of errors because the bugs had been identified and 
improved on over time by a large community of developers. The development process involved 
constant peer review to counter check the logic of the code. 
5.6.4 Testing for Sensitive Data Transmitted in Clear-Text 
The cURL tool was used to attempt an HTTP connection to the server using the command 
below: 
curl -kis http://github.com 
The server HTTP/1.1 301 message indicates that the server is not reachable through 
unencrypted channel, and gives the encrypted link that cab be used. Appendix Eillustrates this 
manual test. 
5.6.5 Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers/Protocols/Keys Vulnerabilities 
The first step was to identify ports which have SSL/TLS wrapped services using Nmap using 
the command below: 
nmap -sV --reason -PN -n --top-ports 100 www.github.com 
Scan results indicate that port 443 (SSL/HTTPS) is open, as shown in Appendix E. 
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The next step was to check certificate information, weak ciphers and SSL/TLS using Nmap 
scripts (ssl-cert, ssl-enum-ciphers) with the command below: 
nmap --script ssl-cert,ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 www.github.com 
Appendix E illustrates this test whereby the GitHub certificate is issued by DigiCert Inc, a 
trusted CA, an RSA public key of 2048 bit is used, sha256 is the signature algorithm and a list 
of strong cipher suites are supported. 
5.6.6 Testing SSL/TLS Certificate Validity - Server 
The cURL command below checks if the certificate presented by the server is valid. 
curl --insecure -v https://www.github.com 2>&1 | awk 'BEGIN { cert=0 } /^\* Server 
certificate:/ { cert=1 } /^\*/ { if (cert) print }' 





Chapter 6  Discussion of Results 
6.1 Overview 
Findings obtained during the study formed the basis on which the auto-update plugin prototype 
was developed. The prototype was tested to ascertain that it met all its requirements. This 
chapter analyses the findings in relation to the research objectives and extent to which the 
findings agree with the literature review.  
6.2 Objective One 
The first objective was to investigate how software updates are delivered and identify gaps and 
challenges in updating software in embedded systems. IoT developers often require updating 
their software in single board computers. This may be due to need to change software 
functionalities, fix security bugs, among other reasons. Section 2.4 identified the main three 
techniques that are used to update software in single board computers. 
Secure Shell (SSH) is the most common technique that provides integrity. However, SSH does 
not provide server authentication. The client device must verify the authenticity of the server 
by verifying its public key on its own. This is dangerous since another server with a valid 
certificate can update the client. 
The developed secure auto update plugin runs on Transport Layer Security (TLS), which 
provides server authentication through Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Server certificate is 
signed by a trusted Certificate Authority. Also, the update plugin is configured to connect only 
to one update source controlled by the developer. 
6.3 Objective Two 
The second objective was to investigate the suitability of PKI in delivering software updates 
securely. Public Key Infrastructure has been used in other system implementations to provide 
secure data transfer between client and server devices. This includes application carrying 
sensitive updates. Section 2.6 discusses the structure and functions of Public Key Infrastructure 
to provide data encryption, authentication and nonrepudiation. Public Key Infrastructure has 
been standardised to allow interoperability across a wide variety of applications and vendors 
through Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS). 
The use of identity certificates and certificate validation algorithms has been defined by ITU-
T’s X.509 standards. Today, there are many vendors that offer Certificate Authority servers as 
a service. This creates a chain of trust amongst communication devices. Modern operating 
systems ship with a list of the trusted SSL vendors which the client devices can trust. This 
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research leverages on this model to ensure and prove server’s identity, as opposed to self-
signed certificates which cannot be trusted in public networks. 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is an implementation framework for PKI for web services to 
provide secure transactions. Section 2.7 outlines its features. It uses cipher suites (section 2.8) 
which define the authentication and key exchange algorithms (such as RSA), encryption 
algorithm (such as Advanced Encryption Standard - AES), message authentication code 
algorithm (such as SHA), and the PRF. 
6.4 Objective Three 
The third objective was to design and implement an automated PKI based updates plugin for 
embedded systems. The update.sh script is run by cron, which refers to a daemon to execute 
scheduled commands. The cron utility is launched by launchd (Unix system wide and per-user 
daemon/agent manager) when it sees the existence of /etc/crontab or files in /usr/lib/cron/tabs. 
The crontab shown in figure 6.1 was created to checks the status of the script daily during the 
working hours 9 a.m. - 6 p.m. 
 
Figure 6.1 Crontab 
The cron utility then wakes up every minute, examining all stored crontabs, checking each 
command to see if it should be run in the current minute. 
6.5 Objective Four 
The fourth objective was to validate the PKI based updates plugin for authenticity and integrity. 
Section 5.6 addressed the system security testing to ensure that it is secure. Test on HTTP 
traffic revealed that updates can only be transmitted in an encrypted TLS tunnel, and not in 
plain text. Test on certificate information and weak ciphers revealed that the certificate is valid 
and signed by a trusted CA (DigiCert Inc). A strong cipher suite 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 is used for communication. 
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Therefore, the automated tool is able to update custom applications for embedded systems in a 
secure way. 
6.6 Advantages of the Developed Solution Compared to Existing Tools  
6.6.1 Open Source 
The secure update plugin is an open source software that can be downloaded via 
https://github.com/vmalombe/Auto-Update-Plugin-for-Single-Board-Computer-Software.git. 
It is distributed under the MIT License whose conditions only require preservation of copyright 
and license notices. Licensed works, modifications, and larger works may be distributed under 
different terms and without source code. 
6.6.2 Multiplatform 
The software is largely build on shell scripting which is supported in many operating systems. 
It can be used to update code for any programming language if it can be hosted in a version 
control system such GitHub and BitBucket. 
6.6.3 Automation 




Chapter 7  Conclusion, Recommendations and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusion 
The study reveals that IoT developers use unsecure methods to update custom software in 
single board computers. Such update methods increase the attack surface of the embedded 
system, which may be controlling a critical system. Some other ways are not efficient in an 
environment with many single board computers or having many updates to the custom 
software. They take a lot of administration time and effort just to ensure software is up to date. 
The study shows existence of some tools that try to provide an update framework, but they are 
platform depended and not free or open source to be used by upcoming developers or small 
organisations who do not have a budget for such licenses. Using the development tools 
discussed in chapter 4, the automated secure update plugin prototype was developed. During 
system development agile methodology was used. This allowed for more frequent release with 
subsequent user feedback which led to development of a usable and reliable prototype. 
Usability testing and system validation was performed, and respondents generally found the 
tool valuable and satisfying. 
The aim of the developed system is to automate the update process of any custom software of 
single board computers in a secure way. 
7.2 Recommendation 
The auto-update secure update plugin was of great importance to IoT developers. The 
researcher noted however, that there was still a lot more that can be done. The following 
recommendations are thus given: 
There is need for public awareness to the existence of this open source tool. The tool can be 
advanced by collaborating with private and public organisations to encourage IoT developers 
to use it and avoid the issues identified with the identified usual ways of IoT software. Its wide 
use would improve it with time to increase its efficiency. The open source community is 
encouraged to evaluate, critique and give recommendations to improve this tool. 
Developers using private Certificate Authorities and self-signed certificates should install git 
server locally and point to auto-update tool to it. However, the disadvantages of this model 
should be noted and addressed using extra security measures such as having a very secured 
private network perimeter. 
Finally, integration with the single board computer default software base would ensure that it 
is widely used. 
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7.3 Future Work 
The scope of this study was to secure data in transit over the network. Future work will concern 
ensuring that the downloaded updates are secured, and that the single board computers are well 
configured to reduce the attack surface. Security intrusion detection and alert capabilities will 
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Appendix A TLS Handshake Message Structure 
 
Figure A.1 ClientHello Message Structure 
 
Figure A.2 ServerHello Message Structure 
 




Figure A.4 Client Key Exchange Message Structure 
 
Figure A.5 Calculating master_secret 
 




Appendix B Setup and Configuration 
 
Figure B.1 Configuration Welcome Message 
 




Figure B.3 Set Frequency of Update 
 








Appendix C Server Connection 
 
Figure C.1 Code Connect to Server 
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Figure D.1 Encrypted Application & Alert Packets 
 




Figure D.3 Encrypted Update Packet 
 




Appendix E Manual Testing 
 
Figure E.1 Testing for Sensitive Data Transmitted in Clear-Text 
 








Figure E.4 Testing SSL/TLS Certificate Validity - Server 
 
